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STATE ACTION NECESSARY TO INVOKE STATE DUE PROCESS
Helfinstine v. Martin, 561 P.2d 951 (Okla. 1977)
In Helfinstine v. Martin,1 the Oklahoma Supreme Court refused to
extend state due process protection beyond that afforded by the federal
constitution by upholding the constitutionality of self-help repossession
under section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Plaintiff purchased a pickup truck in Florida and returned with it
to Oklahoma after executing an installment sales agreement giving the
finance company a secured interest in the vehicle.2  When plaintiff
subsequently defaulted on the contract, defendant, as creditor's agent,
repossessed the truck under a contract provision providing the seller
with "all the rights and remedies of a Secured Party under the Uniform
Commercial Code."3 Plaintiff filed suit in Oklahoma state court alleg-
ing wrongful repossession of the vehicle and asking for actual and puni-
tive damages. The jury returned a verdict in his favor, but the court
granted defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.'
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals reversed,6 finding the statutory self-
help authority of section 9-503 of the Oklahoma Uniform Commercial
Code7 a violation of the Oklahoma Constitution because it allowed a
secured creditor to take possession of a debtor's property without due
process of law. The Oklahoma Supreme Court vacated the court of
1. 561 P.2d 951 (Okla. 1977).
2. The Helfinstine facts are typical of § 9-503 cases. See Note, Self-Help Repos-
session: The Constitutional Attack, The Legislative Response, and the Economic Impli-
cations, 62 GEO. L.J. 273, 278-79 (1973). One commentator suggests that self-help
repossession is rarely used outside of automobile sales because the possibility of breach-
ing the peace to retake a "soiled arm chair" is hardly worth the risk. See White, The
Abolition of Self-Help Repossession: The Poor Pay Even More, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 503.
3. In addition to the broad inclusion of all statutory rights and remedies, the con-
tract specifically allowed for repossession by the creditor "wherever the same may be
found with free right to entry." 561 P.2d at 953 n.1.
4. Plaintiff asked the court to order defendants to return his truck to him and to
cancel the security agreement. If the truck was not returned to him, the plaintiff asked
the court for its value and $50,000 punitive damages. Id. at 953.
5. Id.
6. Helfinstine v. Martin, 47 OKnLA. B.A.J. 973 (Ct. App. 1976).
7. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-503 (West 1963). The relevant portion reads:
"Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take possession of
the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial process
if this can be done without breach of the peace or may proceed by action."
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appeals decision, reinstated the trial court judgment, and held: The
due process provision of the Oklahoma Constitution, like the fourteenth
amendment, is designed to protect citizens from arbitrary and un-
reasonable action by the state. Self-help repossession although author-
ized by the state legislature, does not involve the state to the extent
necessary to invoke Oklahoma due process protection.".
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment0 requires that
notice 0 and an opportunity to be heard" be given to a debtor prior
to depriving him'2 of a possessory interest'8 in his personal property.14
Although variance in form is tolerated,' 5 these procedural require-
8. 561 P.2d 951, 958-60 (Okla. 1977).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."
10. Notice is required to give meaning to the opportunity to be heard. Obviously,
an opportunity to defend offered to a party who is not given notice, is a sham. Windsor
v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277-78 (1876); accord, McVeigh v. United States, 78 U.S.
(11 Wall.) 259 (1870).
11. The constitutional right to be heard is a basic aspect of the duty of gov-
ernment to follow a fair process of decisionmaking when it acts to deprive a
person of his possessions. The purpose of this requirement is not only to
ensure abstract fair play to the individual. Its purpose, more particularly, is
to protect his use and possession of property from arbitrary encroachment-
to minimize substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations of property ....
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972). See Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. Mc-
Grath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950); Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U.S. 409 (1896); Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223
(1863).
12. Even a temporary, non-final deprivation of property is sufficient: 'he Four-
teenth Amendment draws no bright lines around three-day, 10-day or 50-day depriva-
tions of property." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972). Accord, Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
13. Fourteenth amendment protection extends to "any significant property interest."
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971). See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67,
86 (1972) (lack of full title in replevied goods); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539
(1971) (protection extended to statutory entitlement to a driver's license); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (public assistance payments).
14. In Fuentes, the principle was extended to secured transactions. Although -a
conditional sales contract gave the creditor a secured interest, the court found that the
deprivation of the debtor's "continued use and possession" warranted due process safe-
guards. See Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
15. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972); accord, Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371, 378 (1971) ("depending upon the importance of the interests involved and
the nature of the subsequent proceedings"); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69
(1970) ("tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard");
Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) ("appropriate to the
nature of the case").https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss2/8
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ments must occur at a "meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."'16
Postponement of the notice and hearing until after the seizure of the
property is permitted only when an important governmental or public
concern outweighs the property owner's interests.17 Although these
requirements may be waived,' 8 the waiver must be "voluntarily, intelli-
gently, and knowingly" made 9 and, "at the very least, be clear." 20
Where there is a showing of potential danger to the goods in question,
the Supreme Court has sanctioned statutes providing relief for the
creditor if "narrowly drawn to meet any such unusual condition.'
Consequently, statutory creditor remedies authorizing the state to seize
an individual's property upon an ex parte showing22 and without mini-
16. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). Because the Court has never
found that "a wrong may be done if it can be undone," a meaningful time generally
means prior to any deprivation. Stapley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647 (1972). See
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437
(1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260-61 (1970); Opp Cotton Mills v. Ad-
ministrator, 312 U.S. 126, 152 (1941).
17. See Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (to protect
the public from misbranded drugs); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (to guard
against economic disaster resulting from bank failure); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283
U.S. 589 (1931) (to secure government taxes); Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239 (1921)
(to aid war effort). Compare Yudof, Reflections on Private Repossessions, Public
Policy and the Constitution, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 954 (1974), with White, supra note 2.
18. Most often the taking is effected under a contract which purports to waive the
debtor's legal rights. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94 (1972). One commen-
tator suggests that invalidating § 9-503 may be a futile attempt to afford the debtor
due process if all it leads to is more precise waiver provisions. McDonnell, Sniadach,
The Replevin Cases and Self-Help Repossession-Due Process Tokenism?, 14 B.C.
INDus. & Com. L. REV. 437 (1973).
19. D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972). The Court in
Overmyer found the contractual waiver of due process rights valid after noting that
the two corporations had bargained and drafted the provisions themselves, but said:
"Where the contract is one of adhesion, where there is great disparity in bargaining
power, and where the debtor receives nothing for the provision, other legal conse-
quences may ensue." Id. at 188. The Court reiterated these principles in Swarb v.
Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
20. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95 (1972) (emphasis original). Clarity seems
to be the overriding factor, for the Court refused to ask whether the waiver was "know-
ing or voluntary" when no mention of rights, or waiver thereof, was contained in the
contract.
21. Id. at 93 (quoting Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969)).
22. The replevin statutes struck down in Fuentes allowed the creditor to obtain a
writ with mere rubber-stamp approval by a court clerk of an ex parte application:
Private parties, serving their own private advantage, may unilaterally invoke
state power to replevy goods from another. No state official participates in
the decision to seek a writ; no state official reviews the basis for the claim to
repossession; and no state official evaluates the need for immediate seizure.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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mal judicial supervision2" are unconstitutional. 24
Under the fourteenth amendment, due process is required only of
action in which the state is significantly involved.25 State action may
not be immediately apparent, however: only by "sifting the facts"2
may a court determine whether the "close nexus"27 necessary to find
state action exists between the state and the seemingly private behavior.
Federal courts have consistently held that the mere codification of self-
There is not even a requirement that the plaintiff provide any information to
the court on these matters. The state acts largely in the dark.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
23. In Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974), a Louisiana sequestra-
tion statute was upheld and distinguished from the procedures in Fuentes; see note 22
supra. In Mitchell, the statute required that a sworn affidavit of the facts be presented
to a judicial officer, who made a "probable" determination, as well as prompt mandatory
review of the seizure. Some courts and commentators suggested that Mitchell over-
ruled Fuentes until North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975),
reaffirmed the latter by noting these procedural distinctions. See id. at 608 (Stewart,
J., concurring): "It is gratifying to note that my report of the demise of Fuentes v.
Shevin [in Mitchell dissent] seems to have been greatly exaggerated." (footnotes omitted).
See Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. at 623, 634 (concurring and dissenting opin-
ions); Note, Replevin and Non-Judicial Repossession in Light of Fuentes v. Shevin, 3
MEM. ST. L. REv. 125 (1972); Note, Creditor Remedies and Due Process: Comparing
Mitchell and Fuentes, 10 URn. L. ANN. 243 (1975); Note, Provisional Remedies and Due
Process in Default-Mitchell v. NV. T. Grant Co., 1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 653.
24. E.g., North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (gar-
nishment in pending suit); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (replevin); Sniadach
v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (garnishment of wages); Hall v. Garson,
468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972) (landlord's lien); Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d
536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 924 (1972) (gar-
nishment of bank account).
25. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972); Reitman v. Mulkey,
387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967). For the historical development of the state action doctrine,
see Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948);
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879). See Burke & Reber, State Action,
Congressional Power and Creditors' Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment,
46 S. CAL. L. REv. 1003 (1973).
But see Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 203 (1970) (Brennan, J., con-
curring and dissenting) ("When private action conforms with state policy, it becomes a
manifestation of that policy and is thereby drawn within the ambit of state action.");
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380-81 (1967) (state has codified what inevitably
will encourage private individuals to discriminate); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296,
299 (1966) ("[W]hen private individuals or groups are endowed by the state with
powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumentalities
of the state and subject to its constitutional limitations.").
26. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
27. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
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help repossession, a common law remedy,2 does not constitute suffi-
cient state action to invoke due process scrutiny.29 Although a less
burdensome state action barrier is often recognized where invidious
racial discrimination occurs,30 the courts fear total emasculation of
the state action concept if the same interpretation is applied in section
9-503 situations.3 Presumably, increased federal judicial intervention
28. See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 573 (2d
ed. 1899); Cf. Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d 607, 612 (6th Cir. 1974) ('Were
we to rely upon the mere fact of codification, we would in part be making avail-
able to a complex matrix of human behavior, as regulated by statutes, the scope of
federal remedies."). But see Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340
(1969) ("The fact that a procedure would pass muster under a feudal regime does not
mean it gives necessary protection to all property in its modern form."); Rendleman,
The New Due Process: Rights and Remedies, 63 Ky. L.J. 531, 569-70 (1975) (rejects
the mere codification argument; sees § 9-503 as state authorization for a tort-conver-
sion). See also 26 MERCER L. REv. 1421 (1975); 44 U. Cow. L. REV. 389 (1973).
29. E.g., Gary v. Darnell, 505 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1974); Gibbs v. Titelman, 502
F.2d 1107 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1039 (1974); Brantley v. Union Bank &
Trust Co., 498 F.2d 365 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1034 (1974); Nowlin v.
Professional Auto Sales, Inc., 496 F.2d 16 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006
(1974); Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1009
(1974); Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974). Most of the challenges to § 9-503 in the cases cited
above also sought federal relief by virtue of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1970) provides for a cause of action for deprivation of constitutional rights by a
person acting "under color of any state law," and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970) au-
thorizes original federal jurisdiction for these cases. The criteria necessary to apply
the Act or the fourteenth amendment have been held to be synonymous. See United
States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966).
30. The self-help repossession cases distinguish Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967), on the ground that the fourteenth amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866
were promulgated to protect citizens from invidious discrimination according to race. The
challengers to § 9-503 alleged that Reitman held state authorization for potentially
wrongful private conduct sufficient to find state action. See, e.g., Turner v. Impala
Motors, 503 F.2d 607, 611 (6th Cir. 1974); Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank,
492 F.2d 324, 332-33 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974); Kirksey v. Theilig,
351 F. Supp. 727, 731-32 (D. Colo. 1972). But see Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp.
38 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1039 (1974):
"Since Congress has not chosen to distinguish between constitutionally protected rights
in [42 U.S.C.] § 1983, this court can only assume that the amount of state involve-
ment . . . for a deprivation of one constitutional right would equal the amount of
state involvement necessary for another constitutional right." 369 F. Supp. at 49 (cita-
tions omitted).
31. Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 330 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974). A few federal courts overcame the threshold state
action obstacle and reached the procedural due process question. They found that by
enacting § 9-503 the state had become significantly involved with the property depriva-
tion and had allowed the creditor to perform a function traditionally identified with
Washington University Open Scholarship
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through increased acceptance of constitutional attacks in situations
in which the state is not significantly involved, decreases the role of
state and local governments in the federal scheme.32
The lack of actual state involvement in the property seizure dis-
tinguishes self-help repossession from those creditor remedies which
have been invalidated under the fourteenth amendment. 3  Under
section 9-503, "unless the parties otherwise agree,"3 4 the creditor may
effect self-help repossession without the state assistance3 5 common to
other creditor remedies. The anomalous result is that judicial scrutiny
is denied, and repossession statutes are upheld, primarily because there
is less official supervision.36
Virtually every state has a due process provision closely resembling
that of the fourteenth amendment." Nevertheless, since the Warren
the state. These courts have been unable to distinguish § 9-503 repossession proce-
dures from remedies which have been struck down because they failed to provide for
notice and hearing. See Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Mich.
1974); Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1973); rev'd, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1039 (1974); Boland v. Essex County Bank & Trust Co.,
361 F. Supp. 917 (D. Mass. 1973); Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972),
rev'd sub nom. Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974).
One state has effectively repealed § 9-503 in consumer transactions. See Wisconsin
Consumer Act, Wis. STAT. §§ 421-427 (1971). See also Del Duca, Pre-Notice, Pre-
Hearing, PreJudgment Seizure of Assets-Self-Help Repossession Under U.C.C. § 9-503,
Its Antecedents and Future, 79 DICK. L. REv. 211 (1975); Rendleman, supra note 28;
3 MuM. ST. L. REv. 125 (1972); 44 U. CoLo. L. REv. 389 (1973).
32. Yackle, The Burger Court, "State Action," and Congressional Enforcement of
the Civil War Amendments, 27 ALA. L. Rnv. 479, 480 (1975) (suggests that the Burger
Court's retreat from Warren-era activism and broad state action interpretations is predi-
cated- on a belief that the state action threshold to fourteenth amendment application
is a key to the preservation of federalism).
33. E.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (creditor was issued a writ by
the clerk of the court which was ultimately executed by the sheriff, an agent of the
state).
34. See note 7 supra.
35. In fact, at common law, it was considered "a breach of the peace" if the cred-
itor was to intimidate the debtor by "securing the aid of an officer who pretends to
act colore officii." Waggoner v. Koon, 67 Okla. 25, 168 P. 217 (1917).
36. See Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945, 973 (W.D. Mich. 1974);
Northside Motors, Inc. v. Brinkley, 282 So. 2d 617, 627 (Fla. 1973) (dissenting opin-
ion) (decided on fourteenth amendment grounds); R. ANDERSON, ON THE UNIFORM
COMMERCrAL CODE § 9-503 (Cum. Supp. 1972-73); Alexander, Cutting the Gordian
Knot: State Action and Self-Help Repossession, 2 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 893, 912
(1975); Rendleman, supra note 28, at 571; Spak & Spak, Constitutional Attacks on
Creditors' Self-Help Repossession Rights Under U.C.C. Section 9-503-Developments
in Illinois Secured Transactions, 24 DE PAUL L REv. 378 (1975).
37. Many state constitutions provide that: "No person shall be deprived of life,https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss2/8
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Court's expansion of individual rights protection under federal law,38
civil rights plaintiffs have failed to utilize state constitutional provi-
sions.39 State due process violations, if alleged, are generally presented
simultaneously with federal fourteenth amendment arguments.40 Conse-
quently, most state courts, satisfied that the Federal Constitution ade-
quately protects their citizens' rights, find their own state due process
clauses coextensive in scope with the fourteenth amendment:4 1 A
showing of significant state involvement 42 is necessary to raise the state
due process issue 3 even though none of the state provisions contains
a definitive state action requirement. 44
liberty or property without due process of law." See, e.g., ALAS. CONST. art. I, § 7; CAL.
CONsr. art. I, § 13; CoLo. CONsT. art. II, § 25; ILL. CONSr. art. I, § 2; IowA CONST.
art I, § 9; MICH. CONSr. art. I, § 17; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 10; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6;
OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 7; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 10. See
also note 9 supra.
38. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 489, 493 (1977); Countryman, Why a State Bill of Rights?, 45 WASH. L. Rnv.
454 (1970).
39. Linde, Without Due Process-Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 ORE. L.
Rnv. 125, 133-35 (1970).
40. See, e.g., cases cited note 41 infra.
41. See, e.g., Manford v. Singh, 40 Cal. App. 700, 181 P. 844 (1919); Anderson
v. City of St. Paul, 226 Minn. 186, 32 N.W.2d 538 (1948); State Bd. of Milk Control
v. Newark Milk Co., 118 N.J. Eq. 504, 179 A. 116 (Ct. Err. & App. 1935). See
generally Mazor, Notes on a Bill of Rights in a State Constitution, 1966 UTAH L. REV.
326.
42. See notes 25-27 supra and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., Bennett v. Arizona State Bd. of Pub. Welfare, 95 Ariz. 170, 388
P.2d 166 (1964); Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Howlett, 521 S.W.2d 428 (Mo.
1975); Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Board of Review of Unemployment Compensation
Comm'n, 1 N.J. 545, 64 A.2d 443 (1949); Antinore v. State, 79 Misc. 2d 8, 356
N.Y.S.2d 794 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
44. See Project Report, Toward An Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8
HARv. C.R.-C.L L. REv. 271, 297 n.143 (1973). Compare OxLA. CoNsT. art. I, § 7,
with U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
State courts support this interpretation of their state due process clauses by drawing
an analogy to the identical language of the due process clause of the fifth amendment
of the United States Constitution: "[Nior shall any person . . . be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law." See state constitutional provisions
cited in note 37 supra. Although the fifth amendment contains no explicit restriction
on its application, it has consistently been held to limit only the actions of the federal
government. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242 (1833); accord, United
States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922); Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 84 (1857).
For examples of state court decisions using this analogy, see Kruger v. Wells Fargo
Bank, 11 Cal. 3d 352, 521 P.2d 441, 113 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1974); Helfinstine v. Martin,
561 P.2d 951 (Okla. 1977).
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A number of state courts,4" however, have reevaluated their bills
of rights provisions because of the recent deference by the Supreme
Court toward state actions.4" An increasing number of these courts
rely upon their state constitutions for individual rights protection.4"
Because these courts view fourteenth amendment requirements as
minimum standards 4s which may be "enlarged or modified ' 48 accord-
ing to local conditions, state due process standards are continuously
changing. CognizantV° that the Supreme Court will not review state
court decisions relying on adequate and independent non-federal
grounds,5' state courts are encouraged to maintain active regulatory
roles, 2 independent of the federal government, and necessary to the
45. See notes 48-49, 54 infra and accompanying text.
46. Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State Ground, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 750, 766
(1972), noted in Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court
Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974). See also cases cited in Wilkes,
supra at 423 nn.12-24 and accompanying text.
47. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 454 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Brennan, supra note 38, at 498-99. In California, where the courts are particularly
receptive to state constitutional rights protection, lawyers routinely raise both federal
and state constitutional arguments. See Karst, Book Review, 28 STAN. L. REv. 829
(1975).
48. Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 401 (Alas. 1970); People v. Disbrow,
16 Cal. 3d 101, 114-15, 545 P.2d 272, 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 368-69 (1976); State
v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 265, 492 P.2d 657, 664 (1971) ("I']his court is the final arbiter
of the meaning of the provisions of the Hawaii Constitution. Nothing prevents our
constitutional drafters from fashioning greater protections ... than those given by
the United States Constitution." (citation omitted)); State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349,
346 A.2d 66 (1975); Commonwealth v. Tripplett, 462 Pa. 244, 341 A.2d 62 (1975).
49. Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
50. See Falk, The State Constitution: A More Than "Adequate" Non-federal
Ground, 61 CALIF. L. Rav. 273 (1973); Wilkes, supra note 46.
51. The Supreme Court has said:
This Court from the time of its foundation has adhered to the principle that
it will not review judgments of state courts that rest on adequate and inde-
pendent state ground. . . Our only power over state judgments is to cor-
rect them to the extent that they incorrectly adjudge federal rights. . . .We
are not permitted to render an advisory opinion, and if the same judgment
would be rendered by the state court. . .our review would amount to nothing
more than an advisory opinion.
Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945) (citations omitted; accord, Scripto,
Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960); Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935);
Sutter Butte Canal Co. v. Railroad Comm'r, 279 U.S. 125 (1929); American Ry.
Express Co. v. Kentucky, 273 U.S. 269 (1927); Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S.
45 (1908); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875); see C. WRioHT,
HmDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COuRTS 543-45 (3d ed. 1976). But see Bico,
supra note 46 (author would permit review of any federal question which arises and
is part of the grounds for decision in the state court).
52. Paulsen, State Constitutions, State Courts and First Amendment Freedoms,
4 VAND. L. REv. 620 (1951).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss2/8
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continued vitality of the federal system.53
Only the New Jersey and West Virginia Supreme Courts have pre-
viously determined the constitutionality of section 9-503 on state
constitutional grounds,"4 and both have failed to extend state due
process protection to the debtor-victim of self-help repossession. Signif-
icantly, neither court found that insufficient state action precluded due
process scrutiny of the actual repossession procedures. 5 The New
Jersey court in King v. South Jersey National Bank,16 after finding
insufficient state action for fourteenth amendment purposes,5 neglected
to apply traditional state due process standards in holding that self-help
repossession did not abridge a citizen's "unalienable" rights."' In
53. Hart, The Bill of Rights: Safeguard of Individual Liberty, 35 TEX. L. REV.
919, 924 (1957). See also Project Report, supra note 44, at 286: "To relieve state
courts of their obligation to rethink the decisions of federal courts is to deprive the
people of their double security and remove one of the very justifications for a fed-
eral system."
54. See notes 56-61 infra and accompanying text. In Johnson v. Atlantic Discount
Co., No. 75-2045-SP (Palm Beach County Ct. Nov. 10, 1976), a Florida trial court cited
the Oklahoma Court of Appeals decision in Helfinstine and struck down § 9-503 on
Florida constitutional grounds. The Florida due process clause, the same as the Okla-
homa provision, see note 37 supra, was read literally by the trial judge:
[Djue process, especially as used in the Florida Constitution, fundamentally
means the obligation of Government to provide for the rule of law in society.
S .The states should very jealously guard the rights of their citizens. The
framers of the Constitution of the State of Florida did not shirk this respon-
sibility. They did not limit their guarantee of protection of the right of life,
liberty or property from government bodies only. . . .Unlike the 14th Amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution, there is no provision that "no state
shall ... [." In the Florida Constitution our citizens are protected not only
from infringement by Government, but also from our fellow man. Florida
has guaranteed the rule of law in society. This Court construes [the state
due process clause] as meaning that Florida has recognized its responsibility
to its citizens and will protect their rights from infringement by other persons.
At the very least, it means that the Legislature may not suffer, much less
sanction, a self-help repossession without notice and opportunity for hearing.
55. Both courts, in discussing the repossession itself, were intent on upholding the
statute. That state action was not an obstacle indicates some deviation from fourteenth
amendment standards, however.
56. 66 N.J. 161, 330 A.2d 1 (1974).
57. Id. at 170-76, 330 A.2d at 7-8.
58. Although the New Jersey constitution does not contain a due process clause,
its "natural and unalienable" rights provision has been construed to include due proc-
ess protection. E.g., Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines v. Board of Pub. Util.
Comm'rs, 5 N.J. 114, 124-26, 74 A.2d 265, 270-71, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 876 (1950);
Maxwell v. Goetschius, 40 N.J.L. 383, 391 (Sup. Ct. 1878).
This construction apparently was overlooked by the majority in King. Nevertheless,
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Cook v. Lilly,"9 on the other hand, the West Virginia Supreme Court
forecast that requiring "intricate procedures" for repossession would
generate increased business costs that would potentially have a nega-
tive effect on industry and commerce.6 The court reasoned that the
legislature's presumed recognition of this possibility, evidenced by
the enactment of section 9-503, justified sacrificing the debtor's state
due process rights to alleviate the burden on creditors.61
Article two, section seven of the Oklahoma Constitution requires
that no person be deprived of property without due process of law.
Like the fourteenth amendment, procedural due process under Okla-
homa law requires notice and an opportunity to be heard.6 Oklahoma
courts have recently held that a showing of state action is necessary to
invoke state due process protection,63 but the extent of involvement re-
mains unclear.64  At common law, Oklahoma recognized self-help
repossession authorized by the specific terms of the contract"; and
effected without a breach of the peace. 6 In addition, the Oklahoma
Constitution has a unique provision expressing state public policy that
any contractual waiver of constitutional rights is void.6 7
In Helfinstine v. Martin,6 s the Oklahoma Supreme Court followed
there is an excellent discussion of the potential use of New Jersey constitutional grounds
for invalidating § 9-503 in the dissenting opinion. 66 N.J. at 180, 330 A.2d at 11.
59. - W. Va. -, 208 S.E.2d 784 (1974).
60. Id. at--, 208 S.E.2d at 787.
61. Id. The Cook court considered Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600
(1974), a "dramatic retreat" from the policies of Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972). This has subsequently proved to be an erroneous assumption because in
North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975), the Supreme Court
relied on Fuentes and distinguished Mitchell. See note 23 supra.
62. Greco v. Foster, 268 P.2d 215 (Okla. 1954); In Re White's Estate, 175 Okla.
439, 52 P.2d 1074 (1935); Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. v. Wilson & Co., 146 Okla.
272, 288 P. 316 (1930).
63. See City of Edmond v. Wakefield, 537 P.2d 1211 (Okla. 1975); State v.
Parham, 412 P.2d 142 (Okla. 1966).
64. The court in City of Edmond v. Wakefield, 537 P.2d 1211 (Okla. 1975),
stated only that the state due process clause was "designed to protect citizens from
arbitrary and unreasonable action by the state .. . ." (citation omitted).
65. See, e.g., Kroeger v. Ogsden, 429 P.2d 781 (Okla. 1967); Ben Cooper Motor
Co. v. Amey, 143 Okla. 75, 287 P. 1017 (1930).
66. Firebaugh v. Gunther, 106 Okla. 131, 233 P. 460 (1925); Waggoner v. Koon,
67 Okla. 25, 168 P. 217 (1917).
67. OKLA. CONsr. art. XXII, § 8. This is the only provision of its kind in a
state constitution. See LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING REsEARcH FuND OF CoLUmBIA UNIm-
srry, INDEX DIGEsr OF STATE CONsTrrUnONS (2d ed. 1960).
68. 561 P.2d 951 (Okla. 1977).
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previous fourteenth amendment analysis and upheld the constitutionality
of section 9-503 by reading an equally stringent state action require-
ment into the state due process clause.69 The court found mere codifi-
cation of a widely used common law remedy which does not involve
any state official insufficient to warrant state constitutional protection. 0
The court rejected not only the debtor's due process arguments but
also his allegation that incorporation of self-help repossession into the
sales agreement violated the Oklahoma constitutional section voiding
contractual provisions which abridge fundamental rights.71 If the
benefits of notice and hearing were previously unavailable to the de-
faulting debtor, reasoned the court, no new creditor rights are created
by the contract and thus any waiver is inconsequential.7"
The court's adherence to prior fourteenth amendment analyses of
section 9-503 in its application of the state due process clause is un-
fortunate. More particularly, it is irresponsible to summarily deny
the existence of any state involvement when state law authorizes the
repossession. The cases decided under the fourteenth amendment hold
the state's involvement insufficient to warrant federal intervention; they
do not claim, however, that there is no state action.7 3  The state action
doctrine, restricting application of the fourteenth amendment, is a direct
result of historic concern for state autonomy in the federal system.
There is no reason to assume that state constitutional drafters contem-
plated similar restrictive interpretations." In fact, Federal Bill of
Rights protections were drawn from corresponding state constitutional
provisions.7"
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals recognized the debtor's need for
protection from creditors exercising their statutory right to self-help
repossession.70 The existence of the remedy at common law was
69. Id. at 958.
70. Id. at 954-55.
71. Id. at 958-60.
72. Id.
73. See cases cited note 29 supra and accompanying text.
74. In Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 11 Cal. 3d 352, 521 P.2d 441, 113 Cal. Rptr.
449 (1974), the California Supreme Court expressed its belief that the drafters of the
California Constitution had the fifth amendment limitations in mind.
In Helfinstine, the Oklahoma Supreme Court did not make any attempt to discern
the drafters' intentions. A restrictive interpretation of the state due process clause
was made without question. 561 P.2d at 958.
75. See Brennan, supra note 38, at 501 (citing Brennan, The Bill of Rights and
the States, in THE GREAT RIGHTS (E. Calm ed. 1963)).
76. Helfinstine v. Martin, 47 OKLA. B.AJ. 973 (1976).
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properly irrelevant in the court's ultimate determination. Although it
is uncertain from the decision whether any state action was required
to invoke state due process, 7 the court clearly did not apply federal
standards. It may have deemed legislative authorization or codifica-
tion sufficient where the change wrought by enactment extinguishes
any remnants of procedural rights, "unless the parties otherwise agree. '78
Alternatively, the court of appeals may have adopted one commen-
tator's view that the concentration of economic power in American
society creates a need for bill of rights protection from quasi-govern-
mental corporations as well as the state.79  Because the appeals court
failed to articulate standards for applying the state's due process clause,
the state supreme court was able to avoid evaluating the benefits derived
from a broader state constitutional interpretation.
Although the precise scope of state due process is unclear, federal
limitations do not necessarily prescribe the extent of state constitu-
tional protection.8" On the contrary, because the Supreme Court fre-
quently hesitates to expand federal rights in deference to principles of
federalism,8' states are obligated to assume an active role "designed to
adapt our law and libertarian tradition to changing civilization:"8
[S]tate courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the
full protections of the federal Constitution. State constitutions, too, are
a font of individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond
those required by the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law.
The legal revolution which has brought federal law to the fore must
not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of state law-
for without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed. 83
77. The decision by the court of appeals is void of any statement of the holding
or any reasoning to support the final outcome. Id. One must assume, however, that
state action was deemed necessary because of precedent (see cases cited note 63
supra) and that the court refused to apply strict federal standards to the state due
process clause.
78. The court of appeals found it "pernicious" that § 9-503 allows the debtor to
enjoy his right to due process only by convincing the creditor to "otherwise" agree.
Id. at 975. See note 7 supra.
79. Countryman, supra note 38, at 473-74. See Note, The Theory of State Con-
stitutions, 1966 UTAH L. Rv. 542.
80. See notes 45-49 supra and accompanying text.
81. Force, State "Bills of Rights": A Case of Neglect and the Need for a
Renaissance, 3 VAL. U.L. REV. 125, 163 (1969).
82. Note, The Role of a Bill of Rights in a Modern State Constitution, 45 WAsn.
L. REv. 453 (1970).
83. Brennan, supra note 38,_at 491.
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State bills of rights which continue to imitate federal guarantees will
become superfluous, eroding the state's vitality in the federal process.84
Moreover, emerging state court prominence in the struggle for individ-
ual freedoms should lessen the concerns of those who view the Court's
"Federalism '' 8 as an impediment to human rights protection.8
It is understandable that the Oklahoma Supreme Court refused to
extend state constitutional protection to the debtor in section 9-503
circumstances. This unprecedented court action is more likely to
occur in a state which has previously enlarged its state constitutional
safeguards beyond those offered by federal law. When that state steps
forward and the debtor's rights are restored, state constitutions will
once again emerge as a source of protection for individual liberties.
84. Note, supra note 82.
85. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
86. Brennan, supra note 38, at 503.
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